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listed companies. Employing a more comprehensive 
measure of corporate governance mechanism instead of 
focusing only on one particular component of corporate 
governance is expected to mitigate possible substitution 
or complementary effects of one particular corporate 
governance variable with another (Klapper and Love, 
2004). The impact of corporate governance on firm 
financing policy is examined by observing whether firms 
with strong corporate governance mechanisms have 
different financing policy than those of firms with weak 
corporate governance. By focusing on these two extreme 
groups of firms, inference from the results on the effects of 
corporate governance on financing policy can be drawn 
more unequivocally. 
This study is the first to look at the firms’ financing policies 
using the Fama and French (1999) model. This approach 
not only enables a comparison of financing patterns of firms 
with strong and weak corporate governance scores, but 
also allows us to examine the effects of different corporate 
governance mechanisms on firms financing policy as 
well as on their costs of capital. There is as yet limited 
empirical work on this issue; this study fills this void, albeit 
for a country with small stock exchange. The remainder of 
the paper is organised as follows. Section two describes the 
methodology and the data. Section three discusses the 
empirical findings, and section four concludes the paper.
2. Methodology and Data
In this study, a New Zealand Corporate Governance 
Index is constructed by creating three sub-indices for 
the following corporate governance mechanism: board 
composition, compensation policy, and shareholder rights. 
The total index is the sum of the values of the three sub-
indices. The criteria used to construct the sub-indices are 
similar to those of McFarland (2002), Klein et al. (2005) and 
Koerniadi et al. (2013). A clear benefit of constructing this 
governance indicator is that it is able to capture a wide 
variety of governance features specific to New Zealand 
firms. A potential drawback of this approach is that the list of 
corporate governance features and the weights assigned 
to each feature may be considered arbitrary. However, this 
criticism could be applicable to any constructed index, 
whether for professional or academic purposes. On the 
whole, this detailed scoring system takes into account a 
wide range of aspects of firm governance and therefore 
provides a realistic score. The board composition sub-index 
measures board independence, CEO duality, busyness of 
the directors and the number of annual board meetings. 
This provision is an important governance feature (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). The main responsibility of the board is 
to monitor managers’ performance and reduce agency 
costs. Autonomy is measured by board independence, 
and by the independence of audit, compensation and 
nominating committees. Independent directors are 
expected to be able to monitor managers more effectively 
than inside directors (Fama and Jensen, 1993). This sub index 
also contains measures of board effectiveness, number 
of meetings and the separation of CEO/ Chair positions. 
The next sub-index is related to the share ownership and 
option plans of the directors. This sub-index captures the 
alignment between the interests of the directors and those 
of the shareholders. Chatterjee (2009) presents evidence 
consistent with the view that the equity holding by 
directors provides them with incentives for deeper strategic 
involvement with the firm and Kren and Kerr (1997) offer 
evidence consistent with the view that share ownership of 
directors provides them with incentives to rigorously monitor 
managerial performance. Finally, shareholder rights are 
measured based on the re-election of directors, existence 
of dilutive employee stock options and the presence of 
subordinate shares. These features reduce shareholder 
rights vis-a-vis managers. As such, firms with high scores on 
this sub index are considered to be investor friendly. The 
negative impact of the existence of dilutive stock options 
and subordinate shares will exacerbate poor performance 
of the firm under condition of economic stress. Adjaoud 
and Ben-Amar (2010) provide empirical results that suggest 
when shareholder rights are strong, shareholders can use 
their power to force managers to pay higher dividends 
instead of using them for private benefit. Thus containing 
managers’ opportunistic behaviour is likely to make the firm 
less risky, ceteris paribus. On the whole, these three major 
components of corporate governance are aggregated 
into an overall score. 
To observe a firm’s financing pattern and its cost of 
capital, this study adopts Fama and French’s (1999) 
methodology. The following equation is used to observe 
how a firm finances itself:
(1)
where Yt is defined as the sum of income before 
extraordinary items, interest, income statement deferred 
taxes and depreciation. Dept is the depreciation expenses. 
∆St is the net newly issued shares, which balances the cash 
flow. ∆LTDt is the change in the book value of the long-
term debt. It is the change in book capital from t-1 to year 
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1. Introduction
The financing policies of a firm, comprising of its method 
of financing investments, setting its capital structures and 
their cost of capital, are affected by agency problems 
generated by the separation of ownership and control. 
Empirical results supporting this notion, for example, are 
De Jong and Veld (2001) and Berger et al. (1997) who 
find that firms with entrenched management, i.e., with 
weak governance, are more likely to issue equity than 
debt to protect themselves from external corporate 
control forces such as takeovers. Stulz (1988) however, 
argues that entrenched managers may increase leverage 
in an attempt to shield their firm from takeovers. This is 
more consistent with a recent study by John and Litov 
(2010) that finds firms with entrenched management are 
generally associated with higher leverage. Despite the 
reported conflicting empirical results, the effect of the 
agency problem (in which managers follow self-interested 
objectives at the expense of shareholders) on firm value 
is real. When managers choose a less than optimal debt 
level in their capital structure decisions, their sub-optimal 
financing decisions will lower firm value and/or increase 
cost of capital. Well-governed corporations, however, are 
expected to alleviate these problems by implementing such 
corporate governance mechanism as linking managers’ 
incentives to their firm market value, effective monitoring 
by a more independent board, preventing the dilution of 
firm value through excessive stock options granted to their 
managers, or a combination of these approaches. 
Prior studies on the association between corporate 
governance and firms’ financing decisions usually use a 
specific corporate governance provision, such as the ratio 
of outside directors, board size, or antitakeover provisions, 
as a proxy for the level of corporate governance (see for 
example, Berger et al., 1997; Wen et al., 2002). The results 
of the extant studies are inconclusive. For example, while 
Berger et al. (1997) report a positive relationship between 
the presence of outside independent directors and 
leverage, Wen et al. (2002) find the opposite, and yet 
another study find that outside directors have no significant 
effect on leverage (Mehran, 1992). Similarly, Berger et al. 
(1997) report a negative correlation between firms with 
entrenched management and leverage, but John and 
Litov (2010) find that firms with entrenched management is 
associated with higher leverage. 
This study proceeds by employing a comprehensive 
corporate governance index based on several 
corporate governance components of New Zealand 
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To examine whether firms with weak governance have 
different financing patterns relative to firms with strong 
governance, firms are sorted based on the values of the 
total index and of each index of the corporate governance 
subsets. Then the samples are divided into three parts and 
firms are classified as strong (weak) corporate governance 
firms if they are in the top (bottom) 33 per cent of each 
index. 
Table 2 reports firm leverage as a component of market 
and book capital that is organised based on the total index 
and its sub-indices. Taken as a whole, the results suggest 
that poorly governed firms have more leverage than are 
well governed ones. The difference in the level of leverage 
is statistically significant across different governance 
mechanisms, except when sorted according to board 
composition index (Panel B). One possible explanation for 
the insignificant difference in the latter category could be 
that not all independent directors are truly independent or 
have the necessary skills and knowledge to effectively carry 
out their monitoring duties (Koerniadi and Tourani-Rad, 
2012). Another possible reason is that board monitoring and 
other provisions may act as substitutes. When managerial 
incentives are aligned with shareholder interests through 
the firm’s compensation policy, the need for the board to 
monitor management is reduced (Ward et al., 2009).
Table 2. Long term debt sorted according to the value of each index
Panel A. Total Index
Component of Market Capital Component of Book Capital
STRONG WEAK STRONG WEAK
0.14 0.18**  0.19 0.22
Panel B. Board Composition
Component of Market Capital Component of Book Capital
STRONG WEAK STRONG WEAK
0.15 0.16  0.19 0.19
Panel C. Compensation Policy
Component of Market Capital Component of Book Capital
STRONG WEAK STRONG WEAK
0.13            0.19***  0.18 0.21*
Panel D. Shareholder Rights
Component of Market Capital Component of Book Capital
STRONG WEAK STRONG WEAK
0.12           0.18***  0.16            0.21**
Notes: A firm’s market capital is the sum of the market value of its common stock plus the book value of its short-term and 
long–term debts. A firm’s book capital is the sum of the book value of its common equity plus the book value of its short-term and 
long–term debts. Firms in the top (bottom) 33% sorted based on the corresponding corporate governance index are classified 
as strong (weak) governed firms.  *,**,*** denote significantly different from their counterparts at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (for 
two-tail tests). 
Table 3 focuses on how firms with different corporate 
governance levels finance their investments. Panel A 
shows that firms with stronger governance invest around 12 
per cent of book capital and pay dividends and interest 
expenses of 5 percent and 2 percent of book capital, 
respectively. Because cash earnings, Y + Dep, are not 
sufficient to finance these cash outlays (11 percent), these 
firms are likely to issue equity rather than debt to finance 
their expenditures. These financing patterns however, 
are not statistically different from those of firms with weak 
governance. 
The costs of capital of poorly governed firms are observed 
to be significantly higher than those of strong firms with high 
governance scores. This is in accordance with the previous 
related literature such as Chen et al. (2009) who find that 
firm-level corporate governance quality has a significantly 
negative effect on the cost of equity capital in countries 
with weak legal protection of investors. Financing patterns 
of strong and weak governance firms are similar when 
sorted according to their board composition index (Panel 
B).  
When firms are ranked according to the compensation 
policy index (Panel C), firms that have a better alignment 
among their managers’ incentive with those of shareholders 
are observed to finance their cash shortages by issuing 
equity, whereas firms with a low compensation policy index 
are likely to have issued more debt. Similarly, firms with 
weak shareholder rights are more likely to issue debt to 
t, plus depreciation. Intt is the total interest expenses paid 
to creditors. Divt is the total dividends paid to shareholders. 
All of the variables are deflated by the value of the year-
beginning book assets. The change in short-term interest 
bearing liabilities is not included in this equation because 
data for this variable are not available. As a result, ∆St could 
be slightly overstated. However, as the change in short-term 
interest bearing liabilities is usually small, this omission should 
not have a significant impact on ∆St. To measure implied 
cost of capital of firms in our sample, for each year, the 
following equation is estimated:
(2)
where IVt-1 is the initial market value of a firm’s capital 
in the sample at year t-1. The market value of a firm is 
calculated as the sum of its equity plus the book values of 
short-term and long-term debts. Y, I and LTD are as defined 
above. FS, FB and TV are the dollar amounts of the shares 
issued, buybacks and the market value capital of the firms, 
respectively; r is the firm’s (implied) cost of capital. 
Next firms are sorted according to each sub index as 
well as the overall index to observe whether firms in the top 
33% of each index which are defined as firms with strong 
corporate governance, have a different financing pattern 
than that of firms in the bottom 33%, defined as firms with 
weak corporate governance. 
Financial data and corporate governance variables are 
collected from the annual reports of firms listed in the NZX 
Deep Archive and Reuter DataStream databases for the 
period 2004 to 2008. In total, 88 non-financial firms are in the 
final sample. Observations that do not have the necessary 
variables for the regression analysis are excluded from the 
sample and extreme firm variables that are below the 1st 
percentile and above the 99th percentile are trimmed to 
avoid the effects of outliers. The final sample consists of 319 
firm year observations.
3. Results
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the capital 
structures and financing components of all firms in the 
sample during the period from 2004 to 2008. On average, 
the equity of the firms (as a percentage of either market or 
book capital) is larger than their long-term debt. Common 
equity as a percentage of market (book) capital is 0.65 
(0.56) and long-term debt as a percentage of market 
(book) capital is 0.16 (0.19). Firms in the sample make gross 
investments that average 14 percent of their book capital. 
In addition, firms also make substantial payments to security 
holders. Average dividends and interest expenses account 
for 5 percent and 2 percent of book capital, respectively. 
Firms also reduce their long-term debt by 2 percent. These 
cash outlays are not fully supported by cash earnings 
however, as total cash earnings, Y + Dep, account for only 
11 percent of book capital. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 AVERAGE SD MIN 25TH MEDIAN 75TH MAX
Equity1 0.65 0.19 0.08 0.54 0.67 0.76 0.99
LTD1 0.16 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.25 0.59
Equity2 0.56 0.19 0.07 0.41 0.58 0.69 1.00
LTD2 0.19 0.15 0.00 0.03 0.19 0.30 0.57
Y 0.07 0.14 -1.11 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.43
Dep 0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.17
∆S 0.12 0.35 -0.48 -0.11 0.08 0.33 2.43
∆LTD -0.02 0.28 -0.77 -0.22 -0.01 0.18 0.80
Div 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.44
Int 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.10
I 0.14 0.25 -0.47 0.02 0.09 0.21 1.55
Notes: Equity1 is the market value of equity as proportions of a firm’s market capital. LTD1 is the book value of long-term debt as 
proportions of a firm’s market capital. Market capital is the sum of the market value of its common stock plus the book value of its 
short-term and long–term debts. Equity2 is the book value of equity as proportions of a firm’s book capital. LTD2 is the book value 
of long-term debt as proportions of a firm’s book capital. Book capital is the sum of the book value of its common equity plus the 
book value of its short-term and long–term debts. Y is defined as the sum of income before extraordinary items, extraordinary 
item, interest, income statement deferred taxes and depreciation. Dep is depreciation expenses. ∆S is the net new issues of 
shares which balance the cash flows. ∆LTD is the change in the book value of long-term debt. I is the change in book capital 
from t-t to year t, plus depreciation. Int is total interest expenses paid to creditors. Div is total dividends paid to shareholders. These 
variables are deflated by the beginning of year book assets. There are 319 firm-year observations from 2004 to 200
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finance their investments (Panel D). Cash earnings of firms 
with higher governance scores exceed investment outlays. 
Cash earnings average 13 percent and gross investments 
average 11 percent of book capital, respectively. It is further 
noted that firms with low governance scores do not have 
sufficient cash for their expenditures and rely significantly 
on issuing debt to cover their cash shortages. An interesting 
finding is that the dividend policies of both types of firm are 
similar. This result is inconsistent with prior studies (Adjoud 
and Ben-Amar, 2010; Jiraporn and Ning, 2006) that find 
positive effect of corporate governance on pay-out policy. 
A possible explanation to this finding is that, as New Zealand 
adopts a dividend imputation tax system, pay-out policy in 
New Zealand is likely to be motivated more by tax purposes 
rather than driven by corporate governance. 
4. Conclusion
This paper examines the effects of corporate 
governance on financing policy of New Zealand firms. 
Cost of capital of firms with a high corporate governance 
score is observed to be significantly lower than that of firms 
with a low governance score. Furthermore, firms with weak 
corporate governance mechanisms are more leveraged 
than are firms with strong governance mechanisms. As 
New Zealand adopts a dividend imputation tax system, the 
insignificant effect of corporate governance on dividend 
policy suggests that dividend policy in New Zealand could 
be due to other reasons such as tax purposes. 
Table 3. Cash inflows and outflows as percentages of beginning of year book capital of strong and weak 
governance firms
Panel A. Total Index
STRONG WEAK
Yt Dept ∆S ∆LTDt It Divt Intt COC Yt Dept ∆S ∆LTDt It Divt Intt COC
0.07 0.04 0.10 -0.01 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.18 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.16 0.04 0.03* 0.31**
Panel B. Board Composition
STRONG WEAK
Yt Dept ∆S ∆LTDt It Divt Intt COC Yt Dept ∆S ∆LTDt It Divt Intt COC
0.07 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.15 -0.02 0.16 0.06 0.03* 0.31
Panel C. Compensation Policy
STRONG WEAK
Yt Dept ∆S ∆LTDt It Divt Intt COC Yt Dept ∆S ∆LTDt It Divt Intt COC
0.07 0.05*** 0.17*** -0.09 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.24 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.06*** 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.25
Panel D. Shareholder Rights
STRONG WEAK
Yt Dept ∆S ∆LTDt It Divt Intt COC Yt Dept ∆S ∆LTDt It Divt Intt COC
0.08** 0.05** 0.15 -0.1 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.24 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.02*** 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.3
Notes: Yt is defined as the sum of income before extraordinary items, extraordinary item, interest, income statement deferred 
taxes and depreciation. Dept is depreciation expenses. DSt is the net new issues of shares which balance the cash flows. ∆LTDt is 
the change in the book value of long-term debt. It is the change in book capital from t-1 to year t, plus depreciation. Intt is total 
interest expenses paid to creditors. Divt is total dividends paid to shareholders. COC is cost of capital. Firms in the top (bottom) 33% 
sorted based on the corresponding corporate governance index are classified as strong (weak) governed firms.  *,**,*** denote 
significantly different from their counterparts at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (for two-tail tests assuming unequal variance). 
Note
1. This article is based on Koerniadi and Tourani-Rad (2013) 
